Vaccine Hesitancy and Political Populism. An Invariant Cross-European Perspective by Recio-Román, Almudena et al.




Vaccine Hesitancy and Political Populism. An Invariant
Cross-European Perspective






Hesitancy and Political Populism. An
Invariant Cross-European
Perspective. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public





Received: 19 October 2021
Accepted: 7 December 2021
Published: 8 December 2021
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral
with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affil-
iations.
Copyright: © 2021 by the authors.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
Department of Economics and Business, University of Almería, Carretera de Sacramento s/n,
04120 Almería, Spain; mvroman@ual.es
* Correspondence: arr306@inlumine.ual.es (A.R.-R.); mrecio@ual.es (M.R.-M.)
Abstract: Vaccine-hesitancy and political populism are positively associated across Europe: those
countries in which their citizens present higher populist attitudes are those that also have higher
vaccine-hesitancy rates. The same key driver fuels them: distrust in institutions, elites, and experts.
The reluctance of citizens to be vaccinated fits perfectly in populist political agendas because is
a source of instability that has a distinctive characteristic known as the “small pockets” issue. It
means that the level at which immunization coverage needs to be maintained to be effective is so
high that a small number of vaccine-hesitants have enormous adverse effects on herd immunity
and epidemic spread. In pandemic and post-pandemic scenarios, vaccine-hesitancy could be used
by populists as one of the most effective tools for generating distrust. This research presents an
invariant measurement model applied to 27 EU + UK countries (27,524 participants) that segments
the different behaviours found, and gives social-marketing recommendations for coping with the
vaccine-hesitancy problem when used for generating distrust.
Keywords: vaccine hesitancy; populism; alignment; invariance; social marketing
1. Introduction
Vaccine hesitancy and political populism are propelled by similar motivations: a
profound distrust in elites and experts. Political influences are one of the contextual
determinants of vaccine hesitancy behaviour [1]. Kennedy [2] found that, in 14 European
countries, there was a significant association between the percentages of people in a country
who voted for populist parties and of those who believed that vaccines were not important
or effective. In the same way, Peretti-Watel et al. [3] found that, in France, those who had
voted for a far left or far right candidate, as well as those who abstained from voting, were
much more likely to state that they would refuse vaccines. To the best of our knowledge, so
far no one has studied systematically the relationship between citizen’s populist attitudes
and vaccine hesitancy at an individual level in a large sample of countries. Hence, we aim
to expand previous works by studying this underlying link with individual data that come
from a large-scale survey that includes all the countries that belong to EU-27 + U.K. In that
vein, Europe is the region with the highest level of vaccine hesitancy [4] and populism has
recently been on an upward trend [5].
Vaccine hesitancy—the reluctance or refusal to vaccinate despite the availability of
vaccines—is a global issue that has become more pronounced in recent years in almost
every country [6]. One distinctive characteristic of vaccines, when compared with other
medicines, is that it works both at individual and community level. Even in countries with
high national vaccine uptake rates, if a population subgroup delays in acceptance or refusal
of vaccines, the overall immunization strategy (at regional, national or global level) could
be in danger [1].
Achieving a quantitative knowledge of the factors associated with anti-vaccination atti-
tudes is challenging due to the “small pockets” problem: the number of people with strong
anti-vaccination attitudes represents a small minority of the population. Furthermore, any
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large-scale survey must be context-specific and valid. The team managing the survey, and
the ulterior statistical analysis performed with the collected data, need to prove that scales
are suitable in all countries and that their scores and relationships among variables could
be compared. Statistically speaking, this issue is called measurement invariance.
Measurement invariance is becoming an increasingly important topic, but not yet in
the vaccine hesitancy ground. In July 2021, the terms related to measurement invariance
returned about 6337 hits in a Web of Science search (see Appendix A, Table A1 search
#10). Vaccine hesitancy also attracted the interest of researchers, yielding about 5225 hits
(see Appendix A, Table A1, search #3). For answering the question of to what extent the
research about vaccine hesitancy did measurement invariance analysis, we crossed the
previous queries and obtained only 2 hits (see Appendix A, Table A1, search #11). Main
scales used for measuring vaccine hesitancy, based on scores of latent factors from multiple
observed responses, are valid to the extent that the estimated parameters hold in each
group under study (v.gr. country, region, etc.). Therefore, there is a gap in the scientific
literature about vaccine-hesitancy.
Social marketing has been long employed in designing, implementing, and evaluating
public health programs in the fight against several forms of communicable diseases [7–9].
From the marketing perspective, audience targeting and segmentation strategy are the
keys to success [10]. To maximize vaccine uptake, better targeting is reached when based
on people’s attitudes, values, and observed behaviours [11]. For this purpose, we used
invariant measures of two of the main determinants of vaccine hesitancy—distrust and
usefulness of vaccines [12]—and political populism ideas in the European citizens for
determining how these variables relate to each other in EU27 + UK. Considering the
average score that the interviewees in each country had in these three variables, we
clustered them to obtain the different segments of European countries attending to the
relationship between vaccine hesitancy and political populism. Governments and public
health services (either international, national, or regional) could use these results when
designing social marketing programs for overcoming hesitancy barriers associated with
political populism beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours.
2. Populism and Vaccines
Political ideology influences how policymakers address and give solutions to health-
care issues [13]. Recently, many established democracies have experienced a flourishing
of populist political movements [14]. Most of them belong to the right-wing political
spectrum, but not necessarily. Hence, they do not need to share the same interests but only
to fight against the same enemy (“the elite” or “the establishment”) that frustrates and
endangers them all (“the people”) [15]. The elite normally refers to mainstream political
parties, the media, the upper classes, intellectuals, and, in the territorial scope of this work,
the European Union [16]. When applied to healthcare matters, medical populism [17]
is based on a distrust of evidence-based policy interventions and the condemnation of
technocratic knowledge [18–20].
Vaccine resistance fits perfectly in populist agendas. High levels of distrust and po-
larization are fruitful grounds for amplifying dissatisfaction with the elite [21]. Citizen’s
feelings about vaccines depend on their perceptions regarding the competence and mo-
tivation of each of the components of the vaccines value chain (v.gr., the pharmaceutical
business, investigators, and health professionals), i.e., the elite, in populist terms [22].
At the individual level, thoughts and feelings can influence getting vaccinated [23].
Vaccine attitudes lie on a spectrum between the extremes that represent those people
that have fixed anti-vaccination or pro-vaccination views [24]. Active refusal is not the
main concern for the 20 vaccines that are normally included in most of the high-income
countries’ routine vaccination schedules [25,26]. Delaying or spreading out vaccination is a
major concern [23].
For understanding the context in which individual vaccination decisions operate,
we first have to know how the actors perceive the risk involved and how it influences
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their behaviour. Considering the negative impact that vaccine fear has on people’s be-
haviour, public health experts have prioritized confidence in vaccines as a key driver
in vaccination [27,28]. A second key component of vaccine confidence relates to trust
in the social institutional system in which vaccination occurs [29]. Citizens usually re-
ceive vaccination from a healthcare professional (physician, nurse, or pharmacist), so
that trust in them seems to be a very important relationship to consider. Nevertheless,
several studies showed that variation in trust of healthcare providers does not explain
variation in vaccination coverage [30,31]. The influence of trust in vaccination behaviour
must consider other social institutions that could exert more impact in the vaccination
decision-process. Among them, we found the information media, the political parties, the
regional or local public authorities, the national government, the national Parliament, and
the European Union [32–35].
Scales for measuring attitudes toward vaccines have been usually developed for
specific infectious diseases [23]. When measuring confidence toward vaccines in general,
there is evidence that a simplified scale that only considers the perceived benefits of
vaccines performs as well as the entire scale [29]. As the goal of our research is to develop
a parsimonious invariant measurement model for testing the relationship between vaccine
hesitancy and populism in general terms, only two drivers would be considered: the
usefulness of being vaccinated (hereinafter referred as USELESS because it is reverse coded)
and trust in the institutions that form the vaccine environment (hereinafter referred as
DISTRUST because it is reverse coded).
Hence, our measurement model was composed of three variables: two (USELESS and
DISTRUST) that comprised vaccine-hesitancy (hereinafter referred as HESITANCY), and
one that represented the politic populism (hereinafter referred as POPULISM) (see the grey-
shaded area in Figure 1). Once the measurement model proposed is stated as invariant in all
countries under study, we expected that the country means for each of the latent variables
would show differences among countries. We hypothesized, following Kennedy [2], a
highly positive significant association between vaccine hesitancy and political populism.
We expected that the positive association between the variables would be even higher in the
case of the DISTRUST-POPULISM because, as previously explained, distrust in institutions
is one of the main key drivers of political populism and the nexus with vaccine hesitancy
(see Figure 2).




Figure 1. Conceptual Model. The grey-shaded area represents the measurement model composed 
of three latent variables (Useless, Distrust and Populism). The full conceptual model added a second 
order latent variable that constituted vaccine hesitancy (Hesitancy) and an observed variable that 
exhibited vaccine uptake (Vaccination). Arrows and signs represent the hypothesized relationships 
among the concepts. 
 
Figure 2. Measurement Model. The latent variables proposed in the model (circled) and the signs 
hypothesized in their relationships are depicted in the center of the figure. Each latent variable has 
its associated Conbrach’s alpha (α). All of the path loads from latent variables to items are in stand-
ardized terms. *** represents p-values significant at the 1% level of significance. 
  
Figure 1. Conceptual Model. The grey-shaded area represents the measurement model composed of
three latent variables (Useless, Distrust and Populism). The full conceptual odel added a second
order latent variable that constituted vaccine hesitancy (Hesitancy) and an observed variable that
exhibited vaccine uptake (Vaccination). Arrows and signs represent the hypothesized relationships
among the concepts.
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Figure 2. Measurement Model. The latent variables proposed in the model (circled) and the signs
hypothesized in their relationships are depicted in the center of the figure. Each latent variable
has its associated Conbrach’s alpha (α). All of the path loads from latent variables to items are in
standardized terms. *** represents p-values significant at the 1% level of significance.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). USELESS, DISTRUST, and POPULISM are positively associated.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). DISTRUST and POPULISM have the highest positive association.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). POPULISM and VACCINE HESITANCY have a positive significant associa-
tion across countries.
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Sample
The data stem from the EUROBAROMETER survey 91.2 that was carried out between
the 15th and the 29th of March 2019 by the company Kantar Public, at the request of the
European Commission [36]. The dataset was accessed through GESIS (Leibniz-Institute
für Sozialwissenschaften, University of Cologne, Germany) at https://www.gesis.org/
(accessed on 16 October 2021). The EUROBAROMETER is part of wave 91.2 and covers the
population of the respective nationalities of the European Union member states, residents
in each of the member states, and aged 15 years and over. In these countries, the survey
covers the national population of citizens of the respective nationalities and the population
of citizens of all of the European Union member states that are resident in those countries
and have a sufficient command of one of the respective national language(s) to answer the
questionnaire. The basic sample design applied in all states is a multi-stage random one,
totalling 27,524 respondents (see Table A2 in the Appendix A).
3.2. Instrumentation
The survey measured vaccine usefulness (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.86) using four items.
Each item—“To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements . . . ”
Item 1. “It is important for everybody to have routine vaccinations”, Item 2. “Not getting
vaccinated can lead to serious health issues”, Item 3. “Vaccines are important not only to
protect yourself but also others”, Item 4. “Vaccination of other people is important to protect
those that cannot be vaccinated . . . ”—was measured on a four-point scale ranging from
1 “Totally agree” to 4 “Totally disagree”. As the scale was reversed, we named the latent
variable obtained from these indicators as USELESS. We included six items for measuring
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trust (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.77)—“ . . . how much trust you have in certain media and
institutions . . . ” Item 5. “The media”, Item 6. “Political parties”, Item 7. “Regional or local
public authorities”, Item 8. “The national government”, Item 9. “The national parliament”,
Item 10. “The European Union”. Respondents expressed their agreement with these
statements on a two-item scale from 1. “Totally agree” to 2. “Totally disagree”. As the scale
was also reversed, we choose to name the resulting latent variable as DISTRUST. Finally,
the survey asked the interviewees three questions that formed POPULISM (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.63). The first one (Item 11), measured on a four-point scale from 1. “Totally agree”
to 4. “Totally disagree”, was: “The interests of people like you are well taken into account
by the political system in (OUR COUNTRY)”. The second one (Item 12), measured on a
four-point scale from 1. “Totally agree” to 4. “Totally disagree”, questioned “On the whole,
are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way
democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)?” The third one (Item 13), asked the participants
“At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction
or in the wrong direction, in (OUR COUNTRY)?” We recoded this indicator in 1. “Things
are going in the right direction”, 2. “Neither the one nor the other (SPONTANEOUS), 3,
“Things are going in the wrong direction”. The measurement model proposed could be
seen in Figure 2.
3.3. Statistical Analysis
From a methodological perspective, as we compared data from 28 different countries
to check how the vaccine hesitancy’s drivers (USELESS and DISTRUST) were related to
the populist political ideology, we first assessed that the answers were comparable and
that the proposed measurement model applies in all countries (measurement invariance,
MI) [37]. Following the analysis made by Muthén and Asparouhov [38], from the different
methods available to evaluate MI, alignment should be the chosen one. This election was
made based on the following reasons. First, the alignment method works very well with
a small number of indicators. Second, the number of groups is less than 30 (28 countries
in our study). Third, for accomplishing the goals of our research it is very important to
know which countries contribute to non-invariance. The alignment method conveniently
provides this information when compared with the other methodological alternatives
(approximate Bayesian invariance or multilevel random intercepts/random slopes ap-
proach). Finally, considering that our observed indicators are measured in Likert scales, the
alignment method is better because it is nonparametric, allowing any kind of measurement
parameter distribution.
For evaluating the MI of the proposed model, the first step was to check if there
was an identity of parameters among countries through a Multi-Group Confirmatory
Factor Analysis (MGCFA) [39]. MGCFA helped in answering to what degree the proposed
model was invariant/equivalent across European countries. Three (increasingly restrictive)
types of identity were assessed: configural, metric, and scalar invariance. Configural
invariance requires that the same items load on the same factor(s) in all countries [40]. If
the items are associated with the latent factor(s) as expected, then configural invariance
holds [41]. A scale has metric invariance when the magnitudes of the relationships between
items (factor loadings) and latent factors are equivalent among countries. If the model fit
worsens in comparison with the configural one, we would proceed with examining partial
invariance [42]. If the metric invariance is supported, we proceed to test scalar invariance.
This occurs when, additionally to the previous requisites, intercepts are equivalent among
countries [41]. Scalar invariance is established when the fit of the model, with factors
loadings and indicators, and intercepts constrained to be equal, does not worsen from
the fit of the metric model [43]. One of the main goals of our paper intended to establish
meaningful comparisons among the three factors’ (useless, distrust, and populism) means
across the European countries. Hence, we needed scalar invariance.
The notations of these three levels of invariance for a particular item of each factor are
(Equations (1)–(3)):
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Configural:
yij = vj + λj fij + εij
E( fi) = αj = 0, V( fi) = ψj = 1
(1)
Metric:
yij = vj + λ fij + εij
E( fi) = αj = 0, V( fi) = ψj = 1
(2)
Scalar:
yij = v + λ fij + εij
E( fi) = αj, V( fi) = ψj
(3)
where v is a measurement intercept, λ is a factor loading, f is a factor with mean α and
variance ψ, and ε is a residual with mean zero and variance θ uncorrelated with f .
As we already mentioned in the first paragraph of this section, among the different
alternatives available when invariance did not meet, we chose the alignment method.
Following the reasoning made by Asparouhov and Muthén [44] and its implementation
in the software MPLUS 8.6 ( Muthén & Muthén, Los Angeles, CA, USA) [45], we began
estimating the configural model letting loadings and intercepts free across countries, factor
means fixed at 0 in all countries, and factor variances fixed at 1 in all countries. Then, we
proceeded with the alignment optimization freeing the factor means and variances and
choosing their values to minimize the total amount of non-invariance [44,46].
4. Results
As a first step, we checked if the hypothesized measurement model (see Figure 2) fits
well for each European country under study (separately calculated). In order to evaluate
whether measurement invariance was supported, we first performed chi-square difference
tests. Chi-square tests are overly sensitive when, as in our study, sample sizes are large
and when the data is not normally distributed. In these cases, even substantially irrelevant
differences can turn up as statistically significant [47]. This limited the usefulness of
this index in our analysis. Additionally, we considered three global fit measures: the
comparative fit index (CFI), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the
standardized root mean residual (SRMR). We considered models with a CFI value higher
than 0.90, and RMSEA and SRMR values lower than 0.08 as acceptable [48–50]. Fit indices
for all European countries met the generally accepted criteria (see Appendix A, Table A3).
In step two, we tested the configural invariance. This meant that we checked that each
latent variable in the measurement model had the same set of indicators in each country,
the model fits the data well in each country, and all factor loadings are substantial. Fit
indices met the aforementioned criteria: χ2(2828) = 7642.839, p = 0.000; RMSEA = 0.042;
CFI = 0.966; SRMR = 0.052 (see Table 1).
Table 1. MGCFA Model Fit. Configural, Metric and Scalar Invariance Analysis.
Test Results Configural Metric Scalar
χ2 7642.839 11507.306 17318.669
χ2 df 2828 3179 3530
χ2 p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000
RMSEA 0.042 0.052 0.063
∆RMSEA 0.01 0.011
CFI 0.966 0.941 0.903
∆CFI −0.025 −0.038
SRMR 0.052 0.062 0.072
∆SRMR 0.01 0.01
Note: χ2 = chi-square, χ2 df = chi-square degrees of freedom, χ2 p-value = chi-square p-value, RMSEA = Root
Mean Square of Approximation, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Residual,
∆RMSEA = difference in RMSEA from the previous step, ∆CFI = difference in CFI from the previous step, ∆SRMR
= difference in SRMR from the previous step.
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In step three, the fit of the model with all factor loadings constrained across the
28 European countries (metric model) was compared to the fit of the configural model.
If the model fit did not significantly decrease after imposing these restrictions, the more
restrictive model (metric model) could be accepted. As previously explained, the change
in χ2 was statistically significant [χ2(3179) = 11507.306, p = 0.000] (see Table 1), but was
not very useful because of the test’s high sensitivity to the large sample used. For that
reason, we followed the suggestions made by Chen [51] who advised considering the
differences in other model fit statistics (CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR). With N > 300, differences
between configural and metric models are considered relevant when the change in CFI
is larger than 0.010, accompanied by a change in RMSEA larger than 0.015, or a change
in SRMR larger than 0.030. The variation in RMSEA and SRMR held with the maximum
0.01 recommended, but the 0.03 variation in CFI exceeded it.
The metric and scalar models showed many large modification indices. This im-
plied that for reaching a final good scalar model with acceptable fit indices, too many
modifications were needed. Furthermore, the final result could lead us to a wrong model.
As we already mentioned in the methodological section, for overcoming the non-
invariance we applied the alignment method. The advantage of the alignment method is
that metric and scalar invariance are not required for comparing factor means among coun-
tries because it makes them comparable while minimizing measurement non-invariance [44].
We ran the alignment procedure using the software MPLUS 8.6 [45] with the country with
the smallest factors mean (the Netherlands in our case) as the reference group [52]. Results
reached an overall non-invariance of 21.5% ( see Appendix A, Table A4). This result met
the recommended rule of thumb (lower than 25% [53]) and could be considered acceptable.
Additionally, we also summarized in Table 2 the fitting functions of both the factor loading
and intercept for each item considered in the latent variables of our model. R2 values in
this table corroborated these results.
Table 2. Alignment Fit Statistics.
Factor Loadings Intercepts Factor Loadings +Intercepts
Item Code Fit FunctionContribution R2
Fit Function
Contribution R2 Total Contribution
Useless
Item 1 −136.881 0.878 −163.207 0.814 −300.088
Item 2 −134.464 0.898 −152.257 0.902 −286.721
Item 3 −131.675 0.943 −127.993 0.969 −259.668
Item 4 −130.332 0.943 −133.887 0.940 −264.220
Distrust
Item 5 −164.872 0.249 −242.401 0.509 −407.273
Item 6 −187.521 0.452 −197.492 0.825 −385.013
Item 7 −165.045 0.346 −183.488 0.789 −348.532
Item 8 −145.813 0.649 −162.651 0.815 −308.465
Item 9 −150.295 0.663 −173.275 0.882 −323.570
Item 10 −159.713 0.103 −217.085 0.000 −376.798
Populism
Item 11 −143.368 0.624 −187.273 0.727 −330.641
Item 12 −149.007 0.763 −201.916 0.869 −350.923
Item 13 −185.306 0.557 −226.041 0.737 −411.347
Note: The R2 value gives the parameter variation across groups in the configural model that is explained by
variation in the factor mean and factor variance across groups. A value close to 1 implies a high degree of
invariance and a value close to 0 implies a low degree of invariance (Asparouhov and Muthén, 2014, p. 6 [44]).
For supporting the acceptance of the alignment result, we also performed Monte Carlo
simulations based on the alignment parameter estimates for testing that factor means were
well estimated so that countries’ comparisons could be made. In doing so, we used the
number of items, the number of countries, the degree of measurement non-invariance, the
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country-varying factor means and variances, and the sample sizes in the countries. We
carried out the analysis using MPLUS 8.6 software [45] performing 1000 replications. In
order to be trustworthy, a near-perfect correlation was required—at least 0.98—between
the estimated factor means and the generated Monte Carlo ones [38]. In our case, the
correlations were USELESS = 1.000, DISTRUST = 0.999, and POPULISM = 0.998, suggesting
excellent alignment despite non-invariance.
All of the previous results allowed us to feel confident in the reliability of the latent
mean estimates and their comparisons across 28 countries. For better interpreting the
results, the factor means for each of the 28 countries can be seen in Figure 3 (country codes
and number of respondents per country are available in Table A2, and numerical results in
Table A5, both in Appendix A).




Figure 3. Factor Means for USELESS, DISTRUST, and POPULISM in 28 Countries. Alignment 
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package “clValid” from R [54]. Hierarchical methods performed better than K-Means and 
PAM for the three internal measures of clustering validation used (Connectivity, Dunn, 
and Silhouette). Considering the compactness, separation, connectivity, and interpretabil-
ity, the five-cluster solution performed the best. Figure 3 visually depicts the results of the 
hierarchical clustering approach (using the squared Euclidean distance and the Ward 
method). For testing whether the country segments found were differentiable, we calcu-
lated segments’ means differences by applying an ANOVA-Tukey HSD analysis (see Ta-
ble 3). From these results, we concluded that the country segments’ mean differences were 
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2-1 −0.26 n.s. −0.52 *** −0.86 *** 
3-1 −0.64 *** −0.99 *** −1.27 *** 
4-1 −0.04 n.s. −0.23 * −0.46 *** 
5-1 0.08 n.s. −0.64 *** −1.37 *** 
3-2 −0.38 * −0.48 *** −0.41 *** 
4-2 0.22 n.s. 0.28 * 0.4 *** 
5-2 0.34 n.s. −0.12 n.s. −0.51 *** 
Figure 3. Factor Means for USELESS, DISTRUST, and POPULISM in 28 Countries. Alignment
Method. Country codes and number of respondents per country are available in Table A2, and
numerical results in Table A5, both in Appendix A.
For simplifying the interpretation of the results in a data-analytic way, we clustered
the factor means among countries concerning their similarities. Using the factor means
for each of the 28 countries obtained in the previous step, we proceeded to analyze the
different country segments that existed. For choosing the best clustering method we
used the package “clValid” from R [54]. Hierarchical methods performed better than
K-Means and PAM for the three internal measures of clustering validation used (Connec-
tivity, Dunn, and Silhouette). Considering the compactness, separation, connectivity, and
interpretability, the five-cluster solution performed the best. Figure 3 visually depicts the
results of the hierarchical clustering approach (using the squared Euclidean distance and
the Ward method). For testing whether the country segments found were differentiable,
we calculated segments’ means differences by applying an ANOVA-Tukey HSD analysis
(see Table 3). From these results, we concluded that the country segments’ mean differ-
ences were statistically significant for DISTRUST—except when comparing cluster 5 and
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cluster 2—and POPULISM—except when comparing clusters 5 and 3. USELESS only had
statistically significant mean differences when comparing cluster 3 with any of the others.
Table 3. ANOVA (Tukey HSD). Country-Segment’s Mean Differences.
Country-Segments Useless p Distrust p Populism p
2-1 −0.26 n.s. −0.52 *** −0.86 ***
3-1 −0.64 *** −0.99 *** −1.27 ***
4-1 −0.04 n.s. −0.23 * −0.46 ***
5-1 0.08 n.s. −0.64 *** −1.37 ***
3-2 −0.38 * −0.48 *** −0.41 ***
4-2 0.22 n.s. 0.28 * 0.4 ***
5-2 0.34 n.s. −0.12 n.s. −0.51 ***
4-3 0.6 *** 0.76 *** 0.81 ***
5-3 0.72 *** 0.35 n.s. −0.09 n.s.
5-4 0.12 n.s. −0.41 ** −0.91 ***
Note: Country-Segments indicate the segment code number as depicted in Figure 3. Level of significance:
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001, n.s. not significant.
The characteristics of each of the found segments were:
• Cluster 1. The countries that belonged to this cluster were France, United Kingdom,
Spain, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia. They showed the highest mean in
POPULISM, DISTRUST, and USELESS—in this latter case only surpassed by cluster 5,
but not statistically significant.
• Cluster 2. The countries that formed this cluster were Germany, Portugal, Bel-
gium, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. They presented a medium position in
POPULISM—higher than clusters 3 and 5 and lower than clusters 1 and 4—and a
medium-low position in DISTRUST—higher than cluster 3, lower than clusters 1 and
4 and not statistically significantly different from cluster 5. USELESS did not have any
statistically significant difference with any other cluster.
• Cluster 3. The countries that pertained to this cluster were The Netherlands, Finland,
Sweden, and Denmark. They displayed one of the two lowest positions in POPULISM
and DISTRUST—shared with cluster 5. USELESS, especially useful for marking the
difference between this cluster and all the rest, presented the lowest position.
• Cluster 4. The countries related to this cluster were Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta. POPULISM and DISTRUST exhibited
a medium-high level—higher than clusters 2, 3, and 5, and lower than cluster 1.
The only statistically significant difference found for USELESS was that previously
commented with cluster 3.
• Cluster 5. The countries connected to this cluster were Austria, Luxemburg, and
Ireland. As already mentioned when describing cluster 3, this cluster had the lowest
positions in POPULISM and DISTRUST, tied with cluster 3, but not in USELESS, which
was in line with the mean of clusters 1, 2, and 4.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
As a compulsory analytic prerequisite to making comparisons when data from large-
scale surveys in several countries are used, we chose the alignment method that allowed us
to check the invariance of the proposed measurement model. We reached a parsimonious
invariant measurement model for studying the relationships between vaccine hesitancy
and political populism in EUR 27 + UK.
From the two latent variables studied that we used for measuring vaccine hesitancy,
DISTRUST had the strongest relationship with POPULISM (see Figure 2) while USE-
LESS was only statistically significant for differentiating cluster 3 from all the others (see
Appendix A, Table A4). Hence, Hypotheses 1 and 2 holds.
Several European countries felt that the vaccine’s usefulness to fight against infec-
tious diseases was not very high. Only the countries that belong to Cluster 3 (Denmark,
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 12953 10 of 20
The Netherlands, Sweden, and Finland) showed sound confidence in vaccines. For the
rest of the country clusters, the perception of vaccines’ uselessness could be explained
by different reasons. Some European countries that were exposed to Soviet communism
(Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia) depicted higher rates of vaccine USELESS ( see
Appendix A, Table A5). Several investigations have found that weak trust in government,
medical personal, and medical advice from doctors explained these cases [55–57]. For some
other eastern European countries that were also under the influence of Soviet communism
(mainly the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary), the higher usefulness that they por-
trayed in vaccines could be explained by their experience developing vaccines since the
1950s and the role that they played in the propaganda campaigns claiming credit for their
superiority [58]. The rest of the ex-communist states felt, in these moments, the author-
itarianism inherent in communist states when imposing vaccination trials and uptakes,
which generated anti-vaccine sentiments that have remained ever since. Furthermore, not
all the countries with low levels of DISTRUST and POPULISM believed that vaccines were
useful for fighting against infectious diseases. As we saw, all the countries that belonged
to cluster 5 (Austria, Luxembourg, and Ireland) felt that vaccines were useless. From a
social marketing perspective, the results obtained for USELESS suggested that, except
for countries that belonged to Cluster 3, marketing actions needed to be implemented to
reinforce the association of vaccines as a proven and successful solution to fight against
infectious diseases.
Distrust in institutions was the main underlying driver that was associated with both
vaccine hesitancy and political populism (see Figure 2). We also saw (Figure 3) that a
positive relationship existed between the two variables that formed vaccine hesitancy
(USELESS and DISTRUST) and POPULISM. Hence, Hypothesis 3 also holds.
The challenge that the world seems to be facing is trustdemic: falling public trust
is all around the world [59–61]. This could explain how vaccine-hesitancy is increasing
worldwide while having highly effective vaccines. Trusted institutions are the grease in
the social machine. As Khanna [62] said, “When citizens lack trust, they are less likely
to comply with laws and regulations, pay taxes, tolerate different viewpoints or ways of
life, contribute to economic vitality, resist the appeals of demagogues, or support their
neighbours. Without trust, societies are at risk of chaos and conflict.”
Populist political parties know that vaccines are fertile ground for instilling doubt and
trying to gain from polarized debates [63]. The main strategy of populists is to polarize
pro and con views on vaccines, joining them with any other sentiments (anti-chemical,
anti-science, anti-migration, anti-abort, anti-government, etc.) [64]. Results from this
strategy were clear: our measurement model portrayed a strong positive relationship
among DISTRUST and POPULISM in all the European countries.
Vaccine-hesitancy is also very adequate for the populism strategy due to the “small
pockets” issue. They do not need to convince the whole population to follow a vaccine-
hesitant attitude. “Herd immunity”, the level at which immunization coverage has to be
maintained in order to be effective, depends on the vaccine but it typically ranges between
80% and 90% of the population [23,65]. Hence, a small number of vaccine-hesitants can
have enormous adverse effects on herd immunity and epidemic spread. Even more, if
we consider that this low percentage that is leftover to attain “herd immunity” has to be
reserved for people with compromised immune systems or for those that are too young,
for example, neonates.
We also must bear in mind that to be vaccine-hesitant does not necessarily imply that
one does not take any vaccines. Willingness to be vaccinated lies in a continuum ranging
from those who accept all vaccines without any doubt to those who reject all without any
doubt. It is complex and context-specific, varies across time, place, and vaccines [65,66].
Therefore, from the willingness to be vaccinated to the uptake there is still a myriad
of factors that could influence the final decision and that belong to the demand side of
vaccination [8,67]. One of them could be how populism affects vaccination uptake. It
has not been studied in this paper. The mediation role of populism on vaccine uptake,
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depicted in Figure 1, is part of an ongoing research study that has obtained promising
preliminary results.
From the results, there are several implications for management. First, sixteen out of
twenty-eight European countries under study showed high rates of distrust in institutions
and populism and medium-low levels of confidence in vaccines for fighting against infec-
tious diseases. They are all the countries that belong to Cluster 1 and Cluster 4. Populist
organizations likely take advantage of this situation for generating social instability based
on vaccine-hesitancy. Second, having low levels of distrust and populism does not mean
living without problems. Countries that compose Cluster 3 have the highest perception that
vaccines are not useful. Hence, vaccine hesitancy could be high and populist organizations
could profit from this situation. Third, countries that constitute cluster 3 are at the medium
of the spectrum. The two countries that belonged to the former Soviet communism area of
influence (Hungary and Czech Republic) are proud of the role played during the Cold War
when developing vaccines. Nevertheless, the economic, political, and economic situation
in these countries could make them follow the same path as Poland (also proud of their
vaccine experience in the past, but with higher levels of distrust and populism). Germany
shares a similar problem: the landers that were in the Soviet communism area of influence
have higher degrees of vaccine hesitancy and populist organizations are making use of
it [68]. Fourth, countries included in Cluster 3 portray the best position represented by
the low rates of the three drivers. Nevertheless, the “small pockets” concern could be a
problem in these countries due to the existence of global vaccine-hesitant segments [69].
Social marketing must be targeted for convincing vaccine-hesitants that to be vacci-
nated is a societal health strategy and not just a question about individual rights. Proactive
steps must be implemented for restoring the trust in scientists that develop vaccines,
governments, institutions, and businesses. A lifetime acceptance of vaccine programs,
orchestrated through a relationship marketing campaign, could be the basis of a trust chain
for better resisting the negative economic and social outcomes derived from the association
that this paper shows between populism and vaccine-hesitancy.
6. Limitations
The present study has some limitations. The clearest one is the use of the Eurobarom-
eter’s predefined items. Nevertheless, the benefit of the large-scale surveys carried out
by well-known public international organizations is the high quality of the data obtained
through a standardized sampling procedure. It was intended by the authors to fill the gap
that existed in the vaccine-hesitancy literature for testing the invariance of the measurement
items used when several countries were present. For this purpose, Eurobarometer’s data
fit perfectly.
Further research is necessary to quantify how populism mediates the final vaccination
uptake decision. The limitation of using MGFA with alignment for validating the proposed
measurement model could be relaxed—including covariates and using full structural
equation modeling—when testing the mediation model proposed in Figure 1.
Finally, data used for the analysis were gathered between the 15th and the 29th
of March 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic. New more recent data are needed for
reinforcing the proposed relationship between vaccine hesitancy and populism.
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Appendix A




TI=( “vaccin* hesitan*” OR “hesitan* to vaccine*” OR “vaccin* refusal” OR “refusal to vaccine*” OR
“vaccin* opposition” OR “opposit* to vaccin*” OR “antivacc* group*” OR “antivax” OR autovaccination
OR “object* to vaccin*” OR “resilience to vaccin*” OR “debate against vaccin*” OR “vaccin** compliance”
OR “vaccin** adherence” OR “resist* to vaccin*” OR “incomplete vaccin*” OR “misinformation about
vaccine*” OR “vaccin* criticism*” OR “delaying vaccin*” OR “anxiety from vaccin*” OR “criticism to
vaccin*” OR “barrier* to vaccin*” OR “lack of intent to vaccin*” OR “poor completion of vaccin*” OR
“compulsory vaccin*” OR “negative perception about vaccin*” OR “ negative attitudes vaccin*” OR
“engagement in vaccin*” OR “choice to vaccin*” OR “awareness about vaccin*” OR “knowledge about
vaccin*” OR “behavi* toward vaccin*” OR “poor vaccin* uptake” OR “vaccin* uptake rate” OR “doubts
about vaccin*” OR “acceptance of vaccin*” OR “acceptability of vaccin*” OR “contravers* about vaccin*”
OR “religious exemption vaccine*” OR “fear from vaccin*” OR “belief in vaccin*” OR “mandatory
vaccin*” OR “compulsory vaccin*” OR “willingness to accept vaccin*” OR “parental control of child*
vaccin*” OR “willingness to vaccine*” OR “willingness to accept vaccin*”)
1663
#2
AB=(“vaccin* hesitan*” OR “hesitan* to vaccine*” OR “vaccin* refusal” OR “refusal to vaccine*” OR
“vaccin* opposition” OR “opposit* to vaccin*” OR “antivacc* group*” OR “antivax” OR autovaccination
OR “object* to vaccin*” OR “resilience to vaccin*” OR “debate against vaccin*” OR “vaccin** compliance”
OR “vaccin** adherence” OR “resist* to vaccin*” OR “incomplete vaccin*” OR “misinformation about
vaccine*” OR “vaccin* criticism*” OR “delaying vaccin*” OR “anxiety from vaccin*” OR “criticism to
vaccin*” OR “barrier* to vaccin*” OR “lack of intent to vaccin*” OR “poor completion of vaccin*” OR
“compulsory vaccin*” OR “negative perception about vaccin*” OR “ negative attitudes vaccin*” OR
“engagement in vaccin*” OR “choice to vaccin*” OR “awareness about vaccin*” OR “knowledge about
vaccin*” OR “behavi* toward vaccin*” OR “poor vaccin* uptake” OR “vaccin* uptake rate” OR “doubts
about vaccin*” OR “acceptance of vaccin*” OR “acceptability of vaccin*” OR “contravers* about vaccin*”
OR “religious exemption vaccine*” OR “fear from vaccin*” OR “belief in vaccin*” OR “mandatory
vaccin*” OR “compulsory vaccin*” OR “willingness to accept vaccin*” OR “parental control of child*
vaccin*” OR “willingness to vaccine*” OR “willingness to accept vaccin*”)
4333
#3 (#1) OR #2 5225
#4 TI = (“measurement invariance” OR “multigroup invariance” OR “Multi-group confirmatory factoranalysis” OR “factorial invariance” OR “measurement equivalence” OR MGCFA ) 2267
#5 AB = (“measurement invariance” OR “multigroup invariance” OR “Multi-group confirmatory factoranalysis” OR “factorial invariance” OR “measurement equivalence” OR MGCFA) 5614
#6 (#4) OR #5 6174
#7 TI = (“configural” AND “metric” AND “scalar”) 4
#8 AB = (“configural” AND “metric” AND “scalar”) 616
#9 (#7) OR #8 618
#10 (#6) OR #9 6337
#11 (#3) AND #10 2
Source: Adapted from Sweileh [70].
The query was made from 1900 to July, the 22nd 2021 in the Web of Science Core
Collection, Current Contents Connect, Derwent Innovation Index, KCI- Korean Journal
Database, MEDLINE, Russian Science Citation Index, and SciELO Citation Index. Search
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strategy consisted in searching for the selected key terms in the Web of Science’s “Title”
and “Abstract” fields. Some changes were made to the original key terms used by Sweileh
(2020) because of the appearance of false positives when validating the final results. No
language restriction was made.






France FR 1 1013 54,097,255
Belgium BE 2 1041 9,693,779
The Netherlands NL 3 1017 13,979,215
Germany DE 4 1507 70,160,634
Italy IT 5 1021 52,334,536
Luxemburg LU 6 512 457,127
Denmark DK 7 1017 4,838,729
Ireland IE 8 1078 3,592,162
United Kingdom UK 9 1021 52,651,777
Greece GR 10 1014 9,937,810
Spain ES 11 1014 39,445,245
Portugal PT 12 1013 8,480,126
Finland FI 13 1000 4,747,810
Sweden SE 14 1021 7,998,763
Austria AT 15 1006 7,554,711
Republic of Cyprus CY 16 505 741,308
Czech Republic CZ 17 1068 9,238,431
Estonia EE 18 1005 1,160,064
Hungary HU 19 1030 8,781,161
Latvia LV 20 1012 1,707,082
Lithuania LT 21 1004 2,513,384
Malta MT 22 497 364,171
Poland PL 23 1011 33,444,171
Slovakia SK 24 1020 4,586,024
Slovenia SI 25 1016 1,760,032
Bulgaria BG 26 1026 6,537,535
Romania RO 27 1025 16,852,701
Croatia HR 28 1010 3,796,476
TOTAL 27,524 431,452,219
Source: Eurobarometer 91.2. European Commission [36].
Table A3. Fit Indices of the Measurement Model in Each Country.
Country χ2 χ2 df χ2 p RMSEA CFI SRMR
France 217.747 62 0.000 0.050 0.955 0.035
Belgium 157.106 62 0.000 0.038 0.972 0.033
The Netherlands 140.942 62 0.000 0.035 0.975 0.030
Germany 252.921 62 0.000 0.045 0.967 0.031
Italy 261.537 62 0.000 0.056 0.958 0.037
Luxembourg 128.510 62 0.000 0.050 0.960 0.040
Denmark 156.490 62 0.000 0.040 0.970 0.030
Ireland 152.800 62 0.000 0.040 0.980 0.030
United Kingdom 213.690 62 0.000 0.050 0.960 0.030
Greece 261.640 62 0.000 0.060 0.940 0.030
Spain 183.460 62 0.000 0.040 0.960 0.030
Portugal 204.470 62 0.000 0.050 0.970 0.030
Finland 198.010 62 0.000 0.050 0.960 0.040
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Table A3. Cont.
Country χ2 χ2 df χ2 p RMSEA CFI SRMR
Sweden 112.670 62 0.000 0.030 0.980 0.030
Austria 326.950 62 0.000 0.060 0.910 0.050
Cyprus (Republic) 113.250 62 0.000 0.040 0.970 0.040
Czech Republic 215.590 62 0.000 0.050 0.960 0.040
Estonia 203.050 62 0.000 0.050 0.960 0.030
Hungary 408.160 62 0.000 0.070 0.940 0.040
Latvia 227.280 62 0.000 0.050 0.950 0.040
Lithuania 157.190 62 0.000 0.040 0.970 0.030
Malta 271.480 62 0.000 0.080 0.920 0.050
Poland 364.660 62 0.000 0.070 0.900 0.060
Slovakia 523.750 62 0.000 0.080 0.910 0.050
Slovenia 153.170 62 0.000 0.040 0.980 0.030
Bulgaria 285.100 62 0.000 0.060 0.950 0.040
Romania 318.880 62 0.000 0.060 0.930 0.050
Croatia 304.180 62 0.000 0.060 0.950 0.040
Note: χ2 = chi-square, χ2 df = chi-square degrees of freedom, χ2 p = chi-square p-value, RMSEA = Root Mean
Square of Approximation, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Residual.





(1) 2 3 4 (5) (6) 7 (8) (9) 10 11 12 13
(14) 15 16 (17) 18 19 20 21 22 (23) 24
25 26 27 28
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
18 19 20 (21) 22 (23) 24 25 26 27 28
Item 2
1 2 (3) 4 5 6 (7) (8) 9 10 11 (12) (13) 14
15 16 (17) 18 (19) 20 21 22 (23) 24 25
26 (27) 28
(1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 (13) 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Item 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 (12) 13 14 15 1617 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
1 2 3 4 5 6 (7) 8 9 10 11 12 (13) 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Item 4 1 2 (3) 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1617 18 19 20 21 22 (23) 24 25 26 27 28
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 (14) 15 16 17
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 (27) 28
Distrust
Item 5
1 2 (3) 4 5 6 (7) 8 (9) 10 11 (12) (13) 14
15 16 (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 23 24
25 (26) (27) 28
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 (12) 13 14 15 16 17
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Item 6 1 2 3 4 (5) 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1617 18 19 (20) 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 (28)
(1) 2 (3) 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) (11) (12) 13 14 15
(16) 17 18 19 (20) 21 22 23 24 (25) 26 27
(28)
Item 7
(1) 2 3 (4) (5) 6 (7) (8) 9 (10) (11) (12)
13 14 15 (16) 17 18 19 20 21 (22) (23)
(24) (25) (26) (27) (28)
1 2 3 (4) (5) 6 7 8 9 (10) 11 (12) 13 14 15
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 (25) 26 27 (28)
Item 8
1 (2) 3 4 5 (6) 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
16 (17) (18) 19 20 21 (22) 23 24 25 26
(27) (28)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 (9) (10) (11) 12 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 (24) 25 26 27 28
Item 9
1 (2) 3 4 5 6 7 (8) 9 (10) (11) (12) (13)
(14) 15 16 (17) (18) 19 (20) (21) 22 (23)
(24) 25 (26) (27) 28
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (11) (12) 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 (26) 27 28




1 2 (3) (4) 5 6 7 (8) 9 (10) (11) 12 13 14
(15) (16) (17) 18 19 (20) (21) 22 23 (24)
(25) (26) (27) (28)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
18 (19) 20 21 (22) (23) 24 25 26 27 28
Populism
Item 11
1 2 (3) 4 5 6 (7) 8 9 (10) 11 12 (13) 14
15 (16) 17 (18) (19) 20 (21) 22 23 24 25
(26) (27) (28)
1 2 (3) 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Item 12
1 2 3 (4) (5) 6 (7) 8 9 (10) (11) 12 13 14
15 16 (17) 18 (19) 20 21 (22) (23) 24 25
26 (27) (28)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Item 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17(18) 19 20 (21) (22) 23 24 25 26 27 28
(1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 (9) (10) 11 12 13 (14) 15
16 17 (18) 19 20 21 (22) 23 24 25 26 (27)
(28)
Note: numbers indicate the country code (see Table A2). The parentheses indicate whether the parameter
(intercept or factor loading) is non invariant for that specific group (country code) by variable.
Table A5. Factor Mean Comparisons of 28 Countries on USELESS, DISTRUST, AND POPULISM Factors.
Ranking Country Code Mean Countries with Significantly Smaller Factor Mean
Useless
1 26 2.182 27 15 24 5 6 28 1 8 18 21
22 2 23 19 17 9 10 25 11 16
4 12 14 13 7 3
2 20 1.973 24 5 6 28 1 8 18 21 22 2
23 19 17 9 10 25 11 16 4 12
14 13 7 3
3 27 1.942 24 5 6 28 1 8 18 21 22 2
23 19 17 9 10 25 11 16 4 12
14 13 7 3
4 15 1.858 24 5 6 28 1 8 18 21 22 2
23 19 17 9 10 25 11 16 4 12
14 13 7 3
5 24 1.602 28 1 8 18 21 22 2 23 19 17
9 10 25 11 16 4 12 14 13 7
3
6 5 1.502 21 22 2 23 19 17 9 10 25 11
16 4 12 14 13 7 3
7 6 1.409 2 23 19 17 9 10 25 11 16 4
12 14 13 7 3
8 28 1.39 2 23 19 17 9 10 25 11 16 4
12 14 13 7 3
9 1 1.356 2 23 19 17 9 10 25 11 16 4
12 14 13 7 3
10 8 1.315 2 23 19 17 9 10 25 11 16 4
12 14 13 7 3
11 18 1.314 2 23 19 17 9 10 25 11 16 4
12 14 13 7 3
12 21 1.284 2 19 17 9 10 25 11 16 4 12
14 13 7 3
13 22 1.27 17 9 10 25 11 16 4 12 14 13
7 3
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Table A5. Cont.
Ranking Country Code Mean Countries with Significantly Smaller Factor Mean
14 2 1.108 25 11 16 4 12 14 13 7 3
15 23 1.098 11 16 4 12 14 13 7 3
16 19 1.06 11 16 4 12 14 13 7 3
17 17 1.02 11 16 4 12 14 13 7 3
18 9 1.001 11 16 4 12 14 13 7 3
19 10 0.996 11 16 4 12 14 13 7 3
20 25 0.954 11 4 12 14 13 7 3
21 11 0.784 12 14 13 7 3
22 16 0.756 12 14 13 7 3
23 4 0.74 12 14 13 7 3
24 12 0.524 14 13 7 3
25 14 0.266 3
26 13 0.201 3
27 7 0.193 3
28 3 0
Distrust
1 11 0.992 28 9 1 27 16 24 20 25 23 5
17 18 22 8 21 12 2 19 6 4
13 3 15 7 14
2 26 0.903 1 27 16 24 20 25 23 5 17 18
22 8 21 12 2 19 6 4 13 3
15 7 14
3 10 0.9 1 27 16 24 20 25 23 5 17 18
22 8 21 12 2 19 6 4 13 3
15 7 14
4 28 0.876 1 27 16 24 20 25 23 5 17 18
22 8 21 12 2 19 6 4 13 3
15 7 14
5 9 0.802 27 24 20 25 23 5 17 18 22 8
21 12 2 19 6 4 13 3 15 7
14
6 1 0.721 5 17 18 22 8 21 12 2 19 6
4 13 3 15 7 14
7 27 0.688 18 8 21 12 2 19 6 4 13 3
15 7 14
8 16 0.686 18 8 21 12 2 19 6 4 13 3
15 7 14
9 24 0.677 18 8 21 12 2 19 6 4 13 3
15 7 14
10 20 0.674 18 8 21 12 2 19 6 4 13 3
15 7 14
11 25 0.655 18 8 21 12 2 19 6 4 13 3
15 7 14
12 23 0.653 18 8 21 12 2 19 6 4 13 3
15 7 14
13 5 0.605 21 12 2 19 6 4 13 3 15 7
14
14 17 0.586 21 12 2 19 6 4 13 3 15 7
14
15 18 0.532 12 2 19 6 4 13 3 15 7 14
16 22 0.518 19 6 4 13 3 15 7 14
17 8 0.503 2 19 6 4 13 3 15 7 14
18 21 0.439 19 6 4 13 3 15 7 14
19 12 0.413 19 4 13 3 15 7 14
20 2 0.342 4 13 3 15 7 14
21 19 0.298 4 13 3 15 7 14
22 6 0.278 13 3 15 7 14
23 4 0.168 13 3 15 7 14
24 13 0.051 7 14
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Table A5. Cont.
Ranking Country Code Mean Countries with Significantly Smaller Factor Mean
25 3 0 7 14




1 27 1.12 26 28 1 11 16 9 24 20 21 18
25 5 23 12 22 3 2 17 19 4
13 8 15 6 14 7
2 10 1.049 26 28 1 11 16 9 24 20 21 18
25 5 23 12 22 3 2 17 19 4
13 8 15 6 14 7
3 26 0.87 16 9 24 20 21 18 25 5 23 12
22 3 2 17 19 4 13 8 15 6
14 7
4 28 0.859 16 9 24 20 21 18 25 5 23 12
22 3 2 17 19 4 13 8 15 6
14 7
5 1 0.803 9 20 21 18 25 5 23 12 22 3
2 17 19 4 13 8 15 6 14 7
6 11 0.787 9 24 20 21 18 25 5 23 12 22
3 2 17 19 4 13 8 15 6 14
7
7 16 0.678 20 21 18 25 5 23 12 22 3 2
17 19 4 13 8 15 6 14 7
8 9 0.612 20 21 18 25 5 23 12 22 3 2
17 19 4 13 8 15 6 14 7
9 24 0.585 18 25 5 23 12 22 3 2 17 19
4 13 8 15 6 14 7
10 20 0.463 5 23 12 22 3 2 17 19 4 13
8 15 6 14 7
11 21 0.461 5 23 12 22 3 2 17 19 4 13
8 15 6 14 7
12 18 0.417 23 12 22 3 2 17 19 4 13 8
15 6 14 7
13 25 0.4 23 12 22 3 2 17 19 4 13 8
15 6 14 7
14 5 0.304 23 12 22 3 2 17 19 4 13 8
15 6 14 7
15 23 0.131 2 17 19 4 13 8 15 6 14 7
16 12 0.095 17 4 13 8 15 6 14 7
17 22 0.048 4 13 8 15 6 14 7
18 3 0 4 13 8 15 6 14 7
19 2 −0.047 4 13 8 15 6 14 7
20 17 −0.056 4 13 8 15 6 14 7
21 19 −0.068 4 13 8 15 6 14 7
22 4 −0.247 8 15 6 14 7
23 13 −0.293 8 15 6 14 7





Note: This table presents an ordered listing ranging from high to low; the factor mean for each country is followed
by the identification of countries having factor means that are statistically significantly different (p < 0.05). The
numbers indicate the country code (see Table A2).
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